




















This is a self-archived version of an original article. This version usually
differs somewhat from the publisher’s final version, if the self-archived










Citation for pulished version (APA):





The Version of Record of this manuscript has been published and is available in Polar Journal, 10th June 2019,
http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/2154896X.2019.1618554
Download date: 14. Dec. 2021
Evaluating Institutional Effectiveness: The Case of the Arctic Council 
Malgorzata (Gosia) Smieszek 

































The 20th anniversary of the Arctic Council in 2016 provided an excellent opportunity for 
evaluating the council’s performance over its two decades in operation. Along the AC’s 
appraisals, various commentators – both from within and without the council’s circles - put 
forward proposals to reform the AC in order to, arguably, strengthen it and enhance its 
effectiveness vis-à-vis new challenges facing the Arctic. Interestingly, most of those accounts 
have only tenuous, if any, connection with the general literature on international environmental 
regimes and their effectiveness. As a result, they do not draw from the insights flowing from 
this literature and, in reverse, they miss an opportunity to contribute to the broader body of 
knowledge about international environmental institutions. The lack of systematic inquiry also 
hampers our ability to accumulate knowledge about the performance of the Arctic Council 
itself. To address that matter, this article draws up a basic framework through which future 
assessments of the AC’s effectiveness could be grounded in the general literature on 
international regimes. The study treats the AC as an institution or regime as these terms are 
used in the broader literature on international relations. It adopts the political definition of 
institutional effectiveness and is based on literature reviews related to international regimes and 
the Arctic Council as well as, whenever relevant, on the subject of Arctic governance at large. 
Overall, the article underlines the critical importance of systematic inquiry and transparency in 
producing insights regarding the AC’s effectiveness – as of any other institution – to allow for 
accumulation of our comprehension of what makes the Arctic Council work. 
Keywords: Arctic Council; effectiveness; international environmental regimes; soft-
law; Arctic governance  
 
Introduction 
The 20th anniversary of the Arctic Council (AC) in 2016 presented an excellent opportunity 
for assessing the council’s performance over its two decades in operation. Scholars, 
practitioners and observers of northern affairs praised the AC’s achievements, commented on 
the council’s contributions to Arctic and international relations and reflected on this forum’s 




among other accomplishments, for increasing the prominence of the concerns of Arctic 
indigenous peoples, producing influential scientific assessments, for providing a venue for the 
negotiations of first circumpolar legally binding agreements and finally for promoting peace in 
the region, which previously served as one of the main theatres of the Cold War.1 
Simultaneously, many authors, both from within and without the academic community, put 
forward proposals for the council’s reform and proposed ways for strengthening the AC vis-à-
vis contemporary challenges related to consequences of climate change and prospects of 
increased human activity in the Arctic; however, from a historical perspective, those accounts 
are nothing new. Instead, they represent a continuation of a trend visible almost from the 
council’s foundation. Almost from the establishment of the AC, commentators floated 
numerous reform proposals to attempt to, arguably, enhance the council’s effectiveness. While 
considering those proposals in detail lies beyond the scope of this paper, it is interesting that 
what many of those accounts have in common is their tenuous, if any, connection with the 
general literature on international environmental regimes, specifically with the theoretical part 
of this literature related to the institutional effectiveness. Even if there is no consensus among 
scholars over a single definition of institutional effectiveness or its determinants, the efforts of 
academics in the field have nonetheless produced a very solid body of knowledge that might 
serve as a valuable basis for our analysis of the Arctic Council. Treating the AC as an institution 
or regime as these terms are used in the broader literature on international relations2 allows us 
to tap into that body and make use of the scholarship on regime effectiveness to structure our 
thinking about the AC.3 While this knowledge has been occasionally used to examine various 
                                              
1 Koivurova and Heinämäki, “The Participation of Indigenous Peoples.”; Keskitalo, “Negotiating the 
Arctic.” Nilsson, “Knowing the Arctic.”; Kankaanpää and Young, “The Effectiveness of the Arctic 
Council.”; Young, “Arctic State Changes.”; Koivurova, “Limits and Possibilities of the Arctic 
Council.”; Exner-Pirot,  “The Arctic Council.” 
2 See the definition of an institution/regime in the next part of the article pp.5-6. 
3 Treatment of the AC as a regime/institution is not a novelty in the field of Arctic studies and the 




aspects of Arctic governance, I propose in this article that its more systematic application to 
the case of the Arctic Council – even if challenging in methodological terms – is vital to 
advancing our understanding of the AC. In addition, such approach raises new questions of a 
general nature about the effectiveness of international regimes, in which the Arctic Council 
could serve as a useful case for future studies.  
Among various definitions of institutional effectiveness, this paper adopts the political 
one, concerned with the extent to which a regime contributes to solving or mitigating the 
problems that led to its creation. In that approach the focus rests on observable changes in the 
behaviour of actors that can be convincingly attributed to the operation of a regime and that 
are responsible for the improved environment. The study is based on the literature review 
related to effectiveness of international environmental regimes and to the effectiveness and 
performance of the Arctic Council, both in a general sense as well as regarding examination of 
specific AC issues. Whenever relevant, it refers also to literature on the subject of Arctic 
governance at large.  
The paper proceeds in five parts. Firstly, it begins with the overview of general 
literature on the effectiveness of international environmental regimes, including the most 
important factors to look for in understanding the performance of institutions and the 
challenges posed by the inquiry into institutional effectiveness. Secondly, it provides a brief 
history of the establishment and the evolution of the Arctic Council up to the present day. 
Third, based primarily on the factors related to the effectiveness of international environmental 
regimes and listed in the first part, the paper explores five elements that bear importance for 
the systematic analysis of the council’s effectiveness. In doing so, it refers both to existing 
studies of the AC as well as points out some misconceptions and areas worth closer attention 
                                              
approach used in this paper. See Stokke, “Regime Interplay in Arctic.”; Young, "Creating Regimes: 




in future examination regarding the council’s effectiveness. At the same time, the application 
of the central ideas of the broader literature raises new questions about analysing the 
performance of international regimes in general, where the Arctic Council could serve as a 
useful case study, as outlined in part four. The paper concludes with results that might be of 
practical relevance to policy makers, in particular at a time when the AC is working on its first 
strategic plan to optimise its work and prioritise its efforts and activities over the next decade.  
On a theoretical front, the article aims to contribute to accumulating knowledge about 
the AC and its effectiveness – the rate of which, so far, appears to be rather low. While some 
reasons behind this situation are obvious (for instance, a lack of common conceptual 
framework or transparency in conducted research), it is important to move beyond this stage 
and beyond the “impressionistic commentaries on the effectiveness of the AC.”4 By looking at 
the Arctic Council through the lens of general literature on international environmental 
regimes, this paper constitutes a step in this direction. Concurrently, it needs to be underlined 
that a presented material is not a study of the AC’s effectiveness itself. Instead, it devises a 
basic framework through which the next studies of the Arctic Council could be better grounded 
in the general literature on international environmental regimes and their effectiveness – 
benefitting both our comprehension of the AC and the general body of knowledge on 
international institutions.  
 
International environmental institutions and their effectiveness 
The importance of international institutions as possible drivers of change that can guide and 
affect the behaviour of actors is today well recognised and established.5 Institutions consist of 
“agreed upon principles, norms, rules, procedures, and programs that govern the interactions 
                                              
4 Kankaanpää and Young, “The Effectiveness of the Arctic Council,” 1. 




of actors in specific issue areas”6, and international environmental regimes constitute their 
subset that is concerned with behaviour within areas related to the natural environment, its 
protection and management of natural resources.7 Regimes take shape as devices that groups 
of actors create to avoid or ameliorate the collective-action problems, and they can perform 
various tasks and functions.8 Despite the tendency to think of regimes mainly in terms of their 
regulatory roles, it is important to stress that they also frequently perform other functions, 
including playing procedural, programmatic and generative roles, and the differentiation 
between these roles matters when considering regime effectiveness.9 In other words, regimes 
might be viewed as tools – and as with any tools, they can be evaluated in terms of their 
usefulness in helping to carry out particular functions.10 Regardless of the type of regime and 
undertaken tasks, the effectiveness of international environmental regimes is one of the most 
fundamental criteria for their evaluation; it involves the contributions they make to solve the 
problems that led to their creation in the first place.11 While intuitively simple, effectiveness 
can mean a number of different things and as such has been approached in various manners. 
This paper adopts a political definition of institutional effectiveness, which focuses on changes 
in behaviour of actors that can be convincingly attributed to the operation of a regime and that 
are responsible for the improved state of environment. After all, a regime cannot improve the 
state of the environment without changing relevant human behaviour12 – even if there is no 
                                              
6 Levy, Young and Zuern, "Study of International Regimes," in Young, "Effectiveness of International 
Environmental Regimes: Causal Connections." 
7 Kratochwil and Ruggie, “International Organization,”; Keohane, “Neoliberal Institutionalism," in: 
Stokke, "Disaggregating International Regimes."  It should be stressed that a term ‘regime’ refers here 
to a broader understanding of international environmental institutions than a narrower reading of it as 
encompassing solely legally-binding or regulatory arrangements, as sometimes implied in the literature. 
8 Young, "Governance in World Affairs.” 
9 Young; Young, “Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes: Existing Knowledge.” 
10 Underdal, “Methodological Challenges.” 
11 Underdal, “Methodological Challenges.” It is worth noting that in adopting this perspective, studies 
of regime effectiveness concentrate only on a part of regime consequences, notably those that are 
pertinent to the function of a regime in focus.  




necessary relationship between behavioural adaptation fostered by a regime and impacts 
observed in its problem domain. To explain, part of the reason behind this situation is that 
international environmental regimes almost always constitute only one element of a much more 
complex setting in which various political, economic, technological and social changes and 
developments take place simultaneously. Accordingly, while the change in behaviour triggered 
by a regime can be a necessary condition to improve the state of environment, it is not always 
a sufficient one.13 Moreover, when it comes to our expectations regarding environmental 
regimes, it is worth remembering that “institutions can be a significant factor only insofar as 
human activities count as an important cause of environmental change”, not if the  
environmental change has its roots elsewhere.14 
Because regimes are not actors in their own rights, but instead provide rules of the game 
under which actors pursue their individual goals, the effectiveness of a regime can be 
understood as the extent to which that regime channels behaviours to eliminate or ameliorate 
the problem that led to its formation.15 Empirical and theoretical studies of international 
environmental regimes identified several factors that should be borne in mind when assessing 
the performance of any regime.  
First, it is important to specify the problem addressed by that regime, the one that 
prompted its creation. As straightforward as it seems, reaching an agreement on a definition of 
that problem can be tricky16, and unless specific effort is dedicated to it, various analysts can 
differently regard the nature of a problem targeted by a regime. Things to consider here include, 
for instance, next to explicit institutional goals, hidden agendas and tacit understandings of the 
participants of international negotiations that led to formation of a regime. Likewise, also 
                                              
13 Stokke, “Determining the Effectiveness of International Regimes”; Young, “Regime Effectiveness: 
Taking Stock”. 
14 Underdal, “Determining the Causal Significance,” 64. 
15 Young, "Governance in World Affairs.”  




informal elements that regimes frequently acquire over time and that become important to the 
success of the resultant social practices – all those aspects might affect understanding of a 
problem targeted by a regime. Finally, it is through the practice and impact of external 
developments that initial understanding of the institution’s goals and problems, which 
prompted its creation might evolve with time among its participants.17  
Second, regimes impact the behaviour of regime members and other relevant actors, 
and in consequence affect the content of collective outcomes in international society, via 
various causal mechanisms that can be generally captured under three categories: cognition, 
obligation and utility maximisation. Broadly speaking, these categories correspond to main 
categories of drivers known from political science and important to regime formation and 
performance: knowledge, power and interests. In a case of cognitive mechanism, a regime may 
affect the actors’ behaviour by influencing their awareness of certain problems, ways to address 
them and pros and cons of various mitigation options. In the case of normative mechanism, a 
regime may affect perceptions of the actors about what is right and desirable, or about a proper 
conduct within an issue area, by making certain norms more compelling. Lastly, the utilitarian 
mechanism draws our attention to how regimes may affect behaviour by altering the utility that 
actors assign to behavioural options within an issue area – for instance, by providing incentives 
for rule adherence or adding costs to noncompliance.18  
Third, whichever mechanism is at play, there needs to be a clear standard against which 
we measure and evaluate the effectiveness of a regime. From a methodological perspective, 
assessing the effectiveness of any regime means comparing its observed or predicted 
performance against some standard of “success”.19 One response to address this issue has been, 
                                              
17 Stokke, “Determining the Effectiveness of International Regimes”; Young, "Creating Regimes: 
Arctic Accords".  
18 Stokke, “Examining the Consequences,”; Stokke, “Interplay of International Regimes.”  




such as in the domain of public policy, to introduce to examining the effectiveness of 
international environmental regimes a distinction among outputs, outcomes and impacts of a 
regime. Consequently, the study of outputs focuses on ratification, development of policy 
instruments and other formal steps of implementation taken by actors, usually national 
governments. The study of outcomes focuses, in turn, on measurable changes in the behaviour 
of regime members and those subject to their jurisdiction, whereas the study of impacts 
considers the consequences of a regime defined in terms of change in the biophysical 
environment itself.20 At the same time, it is important to note that assessing the effectiveness 
of an institution becomes increasingly demanding the further we move along this chain. Not 
only do the scores tend to decline in assessment further down we go, but it also becomes more 
challenging to distinguish effects caused by the regime from the “noise” caused by other 
factors.21   
Fourth, next to previously pronounced focus on the structure of a problem addressed by 
a regime as a variable critical to the effectiveness of this regime,22 today it is broadly accepted 
that the effectiveness of specific institutions depends oftentimes not only on their own 
characteristics but also on their interplay with other institutions23, especially in the increasingly 
dense landscape of international institutions and instruments. This, in addition, directs our 
attention also to the fact that while international environmental regimes can shape and guide 
the behaviour of actors in the international and domestic arenas in a number of ways, their 
                                              
20 Young, “Consequences of International Regimes.”  
21 Young, “Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes: Existing knowledge.” 
22 Mitchell, “Evaluating the Performance,” Underdal, “One Question, Two Answers.” In addition, as 
stated by Young, “[i]t is important not to confine the analysis of issue area consequences to problem 
solving in any narrow sense of that term” (“Consequences of International Regimes,” 6). Whereas some 
problems (e.g. resolving jurisdictional disputes relating to areas like Svalbard or Antarctica) are 
solvable in the sense that the results are generally accepted and the issues are unlikely to be reopened 
under any foreseeable circumstances, other problems (e.g. managing consumptive uses of living marine 
or terrestrial resources) cannot be solved in any ordinary sense of the term and require instead the 
ongoing efforts and periodic adjustments in their governing arrangements.  
23 Young, “Institutional Linkages”; Stokke, “Introduction”.  The interplay between the institutions 




effectiveness in doing so is not fixed. On the contrary, regimes change continually in response 
to both endogenous forces and exogenous pressures, and many institutions work better during 
some stages of their operation than others.24  
 Before concluding this section, it is important to mention the methodological challenges 
faced by analysts measuring the effectiveness of international regimes. With respect to the 
political definition of regime effectiveness, those challenges include: making the concept of 
problem-solving operational and thus identifying the empirical evidence that would constitute 
such problem solving; substantiating that the regime in question is actually causally related to 
any change in problem solving in a given issue area; evaluating other factors that may also 
produce those changes in problem-solving; and finally, measuring any observed regime’s 
effects according to an appropriate yardstick.25 As demanding as they are, those steps cannot 
be skipped if one wishes to validate a regime-effectiveness claim, and various analytical 
techniques have been devised to meet this challenge.26 Usually, though, the main problem in 
studies of regime effectiveness appears to be not a lack of appropriate tools (as much as there 
is a considerable scope for further development also in this respect), but a “lack of 
transparency; [where] too often we simply cannot determine how a particular conclusion 
[about regime effectiveness] has been derived.”27 To address this matter, explicit and 
transparent specifications of standards and procedures used to assess regime effectiveness are 
advisable in all exercises of this kind.  
 In summation, the scholarship on the effectiveness of international environmental 
regimes is abundant, and efforts of scholars in the field produced a very solid body of literature, 
examining and explaining sources of regimes’ effectiveness. It is against this background that 
                                              
24 Young, Levy, (with Gail Osherenko), “The Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes.”  
25 Stokke, “Determining the Effectiveness of International Regimes.” 
26 Underdal and Young, "Regimes Consequences.” 




the subsequent parts of this article draw up a framework for future systematic studies of the 
Council’s effectiveness and look at the existing literature on the Arctic Council’s effectiveness. 
Before this examination, a brief introduction to the council and a short overview of its evolution 
are first presented. 
 
A short overview of the history of the Arctic Council  
The Arctic Council (AC) was established by eight Arctic states in September 1996 as a high-
level forum to promote “cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic states, 
with the involvement of the Arctic indigenous communities and other Arctic inhabitants on 
common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and environmental 
protection in the Arctic”28. Its formation marked the second phase29 in the region-wide 
collaboration, launched with the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS), signed in 
1991 and effectively subsumed as one of the pillars of the AC.30 Like the strategy, the council 
was adopted by means of a declaration rather than a treaty, thus reflecting a political – but not 
a legal – commitment of its members to circumpolar cooperation. Furthermore, upon the 
insistence of the United States to keep the council void of any features of an international 
organisation, the council emerged as an institution small in scale, without a permanent 
secretariat or budget and with a chair rotating on a biennial basis among members of the 
council. Next to the category of the members of the council – reserved exclusively for Canada, 
Denmark31, Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden and the United States 
                                              
28 "Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council," hereinafter the Ottawa Declaration. 
29 Koivurova and VanderZwaag, “The Arctic Council and 10 Years.” 
30 While the formation of the council marked a shift in focus from the environmentally oriented AEPS 
toward a broader sustainable development agenda for the North, there was no agreement among eight 
Arctic states on the meaning of the concept of sustainable development.  The Arctic eight could not 
agree to a list of priorities for the new institution, much less to its comprehensive sustainable 
development program. 




(“the Arctic States”) – the Ottawa Declaration provided also for categories of permanent 
participants and observers. The former has been an innovative and mostly unprecedented 
arrangement under which selected organisations of Arctic indigenous peoples have their 
representatives sit alongside ministers and Senior Arctic Officials (SAOs)32 to ensure their 
“active participation and full consultation” on the council’s activities 33. The latter category, in 
turn, has been created for non-Arctic states, global and regional intergovernmental and 
interparliamentary organisations and nongovernmental organisations “that the Council 
determines can contribute to its work”.34 In accordance with the AC rules of procedure, the 
primary role of observers is to observe the work of the Arctic Council, and observers are 
expected to contribute and engage predominantly at the level of AC working groups.35 All 
decisions of the AC and its subsidiary bodies are taken by consensus of all eight Arctic states. 36 
Since its beginning, the bulk of the council’s work revolved around the conduct of 
scientific assessments on the state and change of Arctic environment and human development 
in the region. The assessments –such as the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA), the 
Arctic Human Development Report (AHDR), reports on persistent organic pollutants (POPs), 
                                              
32 Senior Arctic Officials (SAOs) are the high-ranking officials (usually at the ambassador level) 
designated by each Arctic state who meet at least twice a year. Their main task is to oversee the work 
of AC working groups and its other subsidiary bodies in order to ensure implementation of the mandates 
issued by Arctic ministers at the biennial AC ministerial meetings. 
33 "Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council"; Arctic Governance Project,"Arctic 
Governance,";  Bloom, “Establishment of the Arctic Council,”; Fenge and Funston,“The Practice and 
Promise,” 10. 
34 “Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council." Originally, 14 observers were present at 
the signing ceremony of the declaration in Ottawa in 1996 – today there are 39, including actors such 
as China, India and Japan; and organisations such as the International Council for the Exploration of 
the Sea (ICES), the National Geographic Society and WWF. In addition, the group encompasses also 
the European Union (EU), which is recognised as the de facto observer of the AC. 
35 Arctic Council, Arctic Council Rules of Procedure. Revised by the Arctic Council at the Eight Arctic 
Council Ministerial Meeting, Kiruna, Sweden, May 15, 2013. 
36 “Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council." Even though, technically speaking, only 
eight Arctic states are considered to determine whether consensus on any given matter has been reached, 
such is the status and moral authority of permanent participants that in most discussions, they take part 
in the same manner as states. They have been also occasionally able to influence the course of taken 




the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA) and the Arctic Biodiversity Assessment 
(ABA) – have become the hallmarks of the Arctic Council, filling an important niche of 
generating knowledge on the region, raising awareness of changes in the Arctic in the outside 
world and, in some instances, even influencing broader regulatory developments, as in the case 
of the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants or the IMO Polar Code.37 
Among them, the ACIA not only contributed to ground-breaking understanding of the 
transformative implications of climate change for the Arctic38, but its broadly publicised results 
played a part in raising awareness of Arctic issues and of the region, which remained largely 
disconnected from the global context after the end of the Cold War.39 The grave findings of 
the ACIA were further confirmed when the Arctic sea ice extent marked a record-breaking 
shrinkage in the summer of 200740, followed by estimates that the Arctic Ocean could become 
ice free in summers as early as between 2030 and 210041 and that the region might hold up to 
30% of the world’s undiscovered oil and gas reserves.42 Those events, together with the widely 
reported planting of the Russian flag on the seafloor at the North Pole in August of 2007, drew 
unprecedented public attention to the region. It was further escalated by the media frenzy and 
speculations about possible jurisdictional conflicts, growing geopolitical tensions and 
prospects of armed clashes over energy and mineral resources in the Arctic.43 It has also stirred 
a surge of interest in Arctic affairs among many non-Arctic state- and nonstate actors, 
exemplified mainly by their applications for observer status to the Arctic Council, outlining 
their own Arctic policies and laying out proposals for redefining the existing Arctic-governance 
                                              
37 Young,“The Arctic Council at Twenty.”; Downie and Fenge, "Northern Lights against POPs.” 
38 Rogne et al., "IASC after 25 Years.";   Duyck, “What Role for the Arctic.” 
39 Fenge and Funston,“The Practice and Promise”;Young, “Arctic State Changes.”; Koivurova, “Limits 
and Possibilities of the Arctic Council.” 
40 NSIDC, “Arctic Sea Ice Shatters.” 
41 NSIDC, “Arctic Sea Ice Extent.” 
42 U.S. Geological Survey, “Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal.” 




structures. Collectively, all those developments presented new challenges to the AC and the 
Arctic states responded to this interest with a series of council reforms and adjustments. They 
included expanding the criteria for the admission of new observers in 2011, admitting new 
states and organisations as observers at the ministerial meetings in 2013 and in 2017, opening 
a permanent secretariat in Tromsø in 2013 and catalysing the establishment of new regional 
bodies: the Arctic Economic Council, the Arctic Offshore Regulators Forum and the Arctic 
Coast Guard Forum. Furthermore, the AC began to assign time-limited task forces to target 
specific matters, and three of them provided venues for the negotiation of the first circumpolar 
legally binding international agreements: on cooperation on aeronautical and maritime search 
and rescue in the Arctic, signed in 2011; on marine oil pollution preparedness and response, 
adopted in 2013; and on enhancing international scientific cooperation in the region, concluded 
in 2017.44 Finally, the council at present is in the process of developing its first long-term 
strategic plan.45 
Twenty years after its establishment, the Arctic Council is today generally considered 
the primary forum for matters pertaining to the Arctic. Whereas not everyone agrees that it is 
“the principal arena for efforts to address needs for governance arising in the Arctic”46, much 
less for their management, over the course of its lifetime, the council has undoubtedly exceeded 
                                              
44 Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic (signed 
in Nuuk on 12 May 2011, entered into force 19 January 2013); 50 ILM 1119 (2011) (SAR Agreement); 
Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution, Preparedness and Response in the Arctic (signed 
in Kiruna on 15 May 2013) <www.arctic-council.org/eppr> accessed 15 January 2017 (Oil Spills 
Agreement); Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation (signed in Fairbanks 
on 11 May 2017)  https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/1916 accessed 24 April 2018. In 
addition, it should be noted that because the Arctic Council has no independent legal personality, all 
agreements are between the eight Arctic states rather than being ‘Arctic Council agreements’. At the 
same time, even if the council served primarily as the catalyst for their negotiations and signatures, the 
agreements marked an evolution of the AC from a body “set up to discuss, inform and potentially shape 
decisions by national governments” toward more of a decision-making one. Fenge and Funston,“The 
Practice and Promise,” 10. 
45 Arctic Council, “Fairbanks Declaration.” 




expectations of those who observed its convoluted and unpromising beginnings.47 At the same 
time, almost from the start, the AC has been subject to commentary, criticism and reform 
proposals, both from within and from outside its circles. Interestingly, in the course of time, 
the number of the council’s reform proposals appears to have largely outgrown the number of 
actual studies of the AC’s effectiveness – understood here as the extent to which the council 
has been able to alleviate or solve the problems that led to its creation and as the mechanisms 
via which it has been able to generate those effects.48 Moreover, it seems that a significant 
share of the AC’s reform proposals and examinations have been largely detached from the 
general theoretical literature on the effectiveness of international environmental regimes. As 
the first section showed, the scholarship on this topic has been abundant, and even if there is 
still much room for advancement in the field, there is also much substance in it and a very 
strong foundation from which to build a framework for future systematic examinations of the 
Council’s effectiveness. The next section delves into this topic.  
 
Setting up a framework for evaluating the effectiveness of the Arctic Council 
As previously mentioned, the general literature on international regimes does not have a single, 
clear-cut definition of ‘institutional effectiveness’, nor is there a consensus among all scholars 
in the field regarding its determinants. Nonetheless, as shown in the first part of this paper, 
there are also some general findings about the factors that matter for evaluating the 
effectiveness of international institutions that arise from the research carried out thus far. Based 
on those general findings, this section focuses on five elements that bear importance for the 
council’s analysis. They include the following: definitions and natures of problems addressed 
                                              
47 Scrivener, “Arctic Environmental Cooperation,”; Koivurova and VanderZwaag, “The Arctic Council 
and 10 Years,”; Kankaanpää and Young, “The Effectiveness of the Arctic Council.” 




by the council; a matter of yardstick to gauge the effectiveness of the AC; a question of 
institutional interplay; causal mechanisms behind the council’s influence; and finally, 
consideration of the council’s soft-law basis. Whereas four of the factors refer explicitly to 
those described in the first part of this paper and identified in the general literature on 
international regimes, the last one addresses specifically an aspect that has been oftentimes 
raised in discussions about the Council’s (in)effectiveness – the AC’s lack of stronger legal 
foundation. It is through the adoption of those factors from the general literature that this paper 
devises a framework and lays ground for better grounding of the future studies of the Arctic 
Council’s effectiveness within a broader field of scholarly inquiry on international regimes.  
 
Definitions and natures of problems addressed by the Arctic Council 
Defining and specifying problems addressed by an institution bears important consequences 
for the evaluation of effectiveness of this institution; yet quite often, it appears to be a step 
overlooked by the analysts. When we examine the formal goals of the Arctic Council, we see 
that the Ottawa Declaration equipped it with a very broad mandate, which in principle excludes 
no facet of international relations other than explicitly kept out “matters related to military 
security.”49 In practice, however, the work of the council has focused primarily on two pillars 
highlighted in its founding document – the environmental protection and sustainable 
development of the Arctic.50 Even if both fields are very broad and thus might be understood 
differently by various audiences, it is in particular the latter that illustrates well the merit of the 
clarity of a problem targeted by an institution – at least for the purposes of scholarly inquiry 
and assessment – and for several reasons. 
                                              
49 “Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council.” 
50 Young, “The Arctic Council at Twenty.” Some scholars consider such specification of the Council’s 
remit – with division between environmental protection and sustainable development – as a category 
error, where the environmental protection program, instead of being considered as a separate and co-




Firstly, the concept of sustainable development is open to a variety of interpretations. 
While it succeeded in cementing the importance of considering economic, social and 
environmental dimensions of sustainable development as interdependent, it continues to prove 
challenging to measure, given the ambiguity in how to interpret it when applied to concrete 
policy.51 In the case of the AC, defining the concept of sustainable development was not only 
a matter of academic debate; the discord over its meaning hampered the negotiations of the 
Ottawa Declaration52 and did not allow the concept to provide a single directive regarding 
future works of the Arctic Council.53 As a result, from the onset, work explicitly directed at 
sustainable development was confined to the Sustainable Development Working Group, 
which, in the absence of any strategic framework or long-term plan, operated primarily through 
small, locally oriented projects rather than major circumpolar initiatives.54  
Secondly, not only could the Arctic states not initially agree to the actual substance of 
the term of sustainable development, but due to the openness for interpretation of the concept, 
we can observe how the meaning of this broad umbrella-term – one of the pillars and goals of 
the AC – has evolved over time. Such an evolution, to be clear, is nothing unusual, and the 
understanding of the notion of sustainable development often reflects actors’ specific concerns 
                                              
51 Kanie et al., “Introduction: Global Governance.” Moreover, the openness for interpretation of the 
concept of sustainable development has been a feature as much praised as criticised -  see Adger , 
“Sustainability: Exploring the Processes.” 
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and objectives, as well as broader political and economic contexts and their changes.55 When 
it comes to the Arctic Council, this evolution has been particularly visible with regard to 
growing focus on economic matters and business opportunities. As noted by Wehrmann, 
“although similar concerns have recurred prominently on the Arctic Council chairmanship 
agendas . . . their meanings (and relations) have changed.”56 For example, while the Russian 
chairmanship program argued for “sustainable development of the Arctic indigenous peoples” 
and focused on the pollution impacts on their health as well as demand to preserve their ethnic 
identities and cultural and historic heritages, Swedish chairmanship program spoke of 
“environmentally sustainable development”, and Canada, in its agenda for its second term 
(2013-2015), prioritised “sustainable circumpolar communities”, envisioning economic 
development of the North.57 While it might be unnecessary, if at all possible, to always seek to 
define precisely the meaning prescribed to the concept of sustainable development, the analysts 
delving into evaluation of the council’s effectiveness vis-à-vis its stated goals should bear in 
mind this changing meaning of the term. 
Finally, as previously discussed, not all types of problems addressed by a regime can 
be solved in any ordinary sense of the term, and arguably, many of those within the council’s 
remit – be it in the environmental protection or sustainable-development domain – belong to 
this category. Not only can efforts to design and operate environmental regimes succeed “only 
to the limit of the causal roles that institutions play in steering human-environment relations in 
the relevant issue areas”58, but also the pace of changes in the social-ecological systems might 
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be exceeding the pace of improvements induced by an institution. Moreover, many problems 
will require ongoing efforts and periodic adjustments in their governing arrangements, rather 
than one-time solutions, to ensure that the undertaken actions account for observed changes 
and deeper comprehension of issues at stake. What is clear is that the unprecedented pace and 
scale of changes in the Arctic biophysical environment makes attaining goals of sustainable 
development and environmental protection even more challenging; at the same time, 
progressing toward them is increasingly pressing. What this means for the evaluation of the 
effectiveness of the Arctic Council is that a need for standard against which it could be 
compared – and making such a standard explicit – becomes even more important from the 
perspective of scientific inquiry and prospects for cumulative research about “what makes the 
Council work”.  
 
A yardstick to gauge the effectiveness of the AC  
Even though it is clear from theoretical literature on regime effectiveness that any attempts to 
evaluate regimes require explicit yardsticks for such exercises, it seems that with very few 
exceptions59, most of the studies of the Arctic Council did not use any. To advance our 
understanding of the council with regard to this particular matter, two aspects call here for 
consideration: the distinction between various forms of the AC’s effects and the variety and 
number of issue areas that the council has been covering. With regard to the former, one way 
to structure our thinking about the effectiveness of the council would be to introduce more 
systematically the differentiation between the council’s outputs, outcomes and impacts, and 
ask about the council’s achievements in those terms – following this useful distinction from 
public policy and adopted to the international environmental regimes. In this perspective, the 
council’s outputs would be its material products, such as scientific assessments, technical 
                                              




reports and summaries for policy makers as well as ministerial declarations and other 
documents produced by Arctic ministers that set direction and provide guidance for the work 
of the council. To anyone familiar with work of the AC, it is clear how prolific it has been with 
those and with generating knowledge and documenting the state of and changes in the Arctic. 
However, when it comes to demonstrating the causality at the level of outputs – the occurrence 
of some cause-and-effect relationships between the council’s products and respective national 
outputs (e.g. official statements referring to the AC’s work, guidelines or regulations due to the 
findings or recommendations of the council) – the state of our knowledge is very limited and 
presents an important area worth further investigation. What is known and serves as a point of 
criticism against the council is that there is no follow-up mechanism to oversee how the 
council’s recommendations and guidelines are implemented, even if many government 
agencies involved with the AC agree that it would be useful to have some type of such a 
reporting mechanism.60 
Still, it is clear that focusing only on the outputs in examining the effectiveness of the 
council is not sufficient. While we should aim at increasing our understanding of the effects 
the AC has on the behaviour of key actors relevant to challenges of sustainable development 
and environmental protection of the Arctic, it is the extent to which the council has been able 
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to solve or alleviate the problems it was set up to deal with that constitutes our ultimate – and 
extremely challenging – question. 
At the same time, it could be argued that with the number of issue areas that the council 
covers, there might be a need for more than one yardstick for measuring its effectiveness and 
for separately measuring the distinct areas of the AC’s activity. With its broad mandate, the 
council has been dealing with matters as varied as pollutants, hazardous waste, climate change, 
biodiversity, shipping safety, oil and gas development, education, mental health and indigenous 
languages. Not only do those issues present very different challenges, but the scale adequate to 
address them also varies; whereas some can be tackled successfully solely by local or national 
actors, others require action at regional, international and even global levels. Hence, by default, 
we could expect that the council’s effectiveness might not be the same across all those issue 
areas, that some of those matters will be more difficult to solve than others (if at all possible in 
any ordinary sense of a term) and that consequently the council’s “scores” across those fields 
might vary. Perhaps, following the path in the general effectiveness studies, the approach to 
studying the AC has developed to the point where we could systematically split the council 
into particular units of analysis or into different phases61 and study effectiveness across them. 
Arguably, such an exercise – together with defining reference points and explicit yardsticks62 
for selected areas of the council’s activity – could tell us how well the AC has been doing in 
various domains and could help generate a more solid basis for the overall assessment of the 
council. It could also possibly identify the factors that influenced the observed results, be them 
“successes” or not. 
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Irrespective of how the yardsticks of the AC’s effectiveness are constructed, next to the stated 
objectives of the council, they should “mirror the extent to which the behaviour that generates 
regional problems is within the reach of Arctic institutions.”63 Yet despite the previously 
mentioned and well-recognised interconnectedness of many Arctic challenges with activities 
that occur in other parts of the globe, with the exception of Stokke64, not many authors 
systematically considered the interaction between the AC and other issue-specific regimes, 
while those who did carried out their analyses without reference to the findings on institutional 
effectiveness.65 While the calls to consider the role of the council in a broader picture of Arctic 
governance have been regularly repeated since the early days of the AC66, they have hardly 
been followed – neither in the majority of scholarly writings nor in the practices or deliberations 
within the council’s circles – despite the recognised importance and impact of institutional 
interaction for the effectiveness of specific institutions. Such interactions could arguably have 
even greater significance for a body like the AC that, despite its lack of regulatory powers, 
might support the work of other international institutions – for example, with its scientific input 
and with complementary governance instruments, if their objectives align (see below on the 
Framework for Action on Enhanced Black Carbon and Methane Emission Reductions). Of 
particular importance here are the catalytic activities of the council – those efforts under the 
AC aimed at influencing the normative contents of other (usually broader) institutions, such as 
the case of persistent organic pollutants and the negotiations of the Stockholm Convention.67 
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In a similar fashion, through the combination of influential knowledge building through the 
Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA) and providing a forum in which Arctic states 
were able to discuss and develop common positions regarding various shipping-related 
measures, the council played a supportive role to the development of the mandatory Polar Code 
under the IMO.68 At the same time, both examples illustrate that to effectively address some 
of the most paramount Arctic challenges, such as pollution, environmental protection from 
threats of increased human activities in the Arctic Ocean and loss of biodiversity, the council, 
due to its limited membership, is not the right forum to develop stronger international 
regulations. Instead, its role and contributions depend on the constructive interplay69 with other 
international bodies, and thus far, our understanding of those interactions remains limited. 
There is also the possibility of exploiting the full potential for synergistic interaction between 
the AC and other institutions, rather than remaining satisfied only with the lack of disruption 
between them. Drawing from examples of other regimes, it also appears that in the AC, such 
potential for improvement might be frequently neglected where “[p]ositive effects of 
institutional interaction are commonly “consumed” without further action”70, notwithstanding 
the scope for advancement that may exist. 
 
Causal mechanisms and legal basis of the Council 
If we applied to the Arctic Council a distinction between three sources of institutional 
effectiveness (cognition, obligation and utility maximisation) – or, in other words, we 
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considered causal mechanisms behind the council’s influence – there appears to be consensus 
in the literature that, despite the recent excitement about the first legally binding agreements 
negotiated under the auspices of the AC (normative impact), those are scientific assessments 
of the council that have been among its most effective products (cognitive impact).71 The 
council has been named the “cognitive forerunner” for its role as a fact finder and consensus 
builder on Arctic environmental challenges72 and according to results of a large survey, it has 
proven particularly successful in identifying emerging issues, framing them for consideration 
in policy venues and structuring Arctic policy agenda.73 As the studies of Stokke have shown, 
the AC has been well equipped to occupy this cognitive function thanks to its distinctive 
features that ensure high saliency, credibility and legitimacy of the council’s scientific 
products, which enabled it to inform some of the relevant international processes described 
above.74 Next to the POPs and the Polar Code, the AC also provided input in the negotiations 
of the Minamata Convention on Mercury75, and according to Prip, the same mechanism has 
been visible in work of CAFF that has helped to draw international attention to issues of Arctic 
biodiversity, as reflected in several documents of the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(CBD) and a resolution of cooperation between the CBD and CAFF.76  
As illustrated in these catalytic activities, “although consensual knowledge and political 
awareness are important ingredients in problem solving”77, it is only when they trigger action 
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that targets the source of the problem that we may speak about effectiveness. Some of these 
actions or utilitarian mechanisms have been undertaken by the Arctic Council in a form of the 
Arctic Contaminants Action Program (ACAP) working group’s projects aimed at eliminating, 
for example, hazardous waste and obsolete pesticides.78 Some projects of the Sustainable 
Development Working Group (SDWG) could too be counted into this category as the focus of 
this working group centres on providing practical knowledge and contributing to the building 
capacity of Arctic indigenous peoples and Arctic communities. As much as those initiatives do 
not necessarily involve financial or technological transfers, they also include sharing 
experience and best practices in areas as critical for northern inhabitants as mental health and 
suicide prevention.79 
Interestingly, it is also largely in terms of capacity enhancement and of practical 
problem-solving – more than of normative influence – that Stokke views the first legally 
binding agreement negotiated under the auspices of the council: the Arctic SAR Agreement, 
adopted in 2011. Such an assessment appears to be justified since the agreement concerns 
provision of maritime infrastructure, not vessel operation80, and it primarily reaffirms the 
commitments of Arctic states to the conventions they have been parties to, rather than imposing 
on them any new legal obligations.81 Like the Oil Spill Agreement concluded in 2013, which 
shares many similarities with SAR, it can be considered mainly an agreement on collaboration 
and coordination.82 Regardless of those aspects, the successful negotiation (but not adoption) 
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of those agreements under the AC, followed by the third on Arctic international scientific 
cooperation signed in 2017, certainly bore symbolic importance and served to strengthen 
perceptions of the Arctic Council as a vital forum for cooperation in the region. The agreements 
also received much attention from scholars, who pondered over opportunities for enhancing 
the AC and debated further expansion of its role from a policy-shaping into policy-making 
body, as reaffirmed by Arctic ministers in their “Vision of the Arctic”.83 
At the same time, much less attention was given to another novel instrument that the 
council adopted at the Iqaluit Ministerial meeting in 2015. While, in general, soft-law84 
products of the council, such as the Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines85 and the early 
Guidelines for Environmental Impact Assessment in the Arctic86, have seen hardly any follow-
up by Arctic states87, arguably, the Framework for Action on Enhanced Black Carbon and 
Methane Emission Reductions88 represents a different form of the council’s output and is the 
one that might exert a greater normative and behavioural pull than previous tools. Even if the 
framework does not create any legally binding obligations for Arctic states to reduce their 
emissions of black carbon (BC) and methane, the AC members committed themselves to 
establishing BC inventories, enhancing information exchange on BC and methane emissions 
and adopting a quantitative collective goal on black carbon by the AC ministerial meeting in 
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2017.89 Furthermore, the framework established a two-year iterative review process90 to 
strengthen Arctic states’ respective national action plans and mitigation actions, and it calls 
upon the AC observer states to join its implementation, which, in result, could catalyse 
regulations of BC and methane not only in Arctic jurisdictions but also among other world’s 
major GHG emitters that hold observer status to the council, such as China or India.91 Finally, 
while creating linkages between existing relevant bodies of international law (Convention on 
Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, CLRTAP, and the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, UNFCCC), the framework also promotes mechanisms that go 
beyond them to deliver concrete regulatory impacts on BC mitigation. In the words of Khan, 
“whether soft law or not, it may very well lead to a harder legal outcome than current 
international law”92, and this in the area of climate governance, which is of the highest 
importance to the Arctic.  
This, in turn, brings us back to one of the most oft-repeated proposals for enhancing the 
effectiveness of the Arctic Council: turning it into a treaty-based organisation. Contrary to 
widely held beliefs, the legal foundation does not loom large in general literature on 
institutional effectiveness with respect to observed effects or impacts of regimes. Although 
most up-to-date studies of international environmental regimes focused on hard-law, legally 
binding arrangements93, this under no circumstances should be interpreted that in order to be 
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effective, regimes need to necessarily perform regulatory functions or have their foundations 
in treaties or other legally binding instruments.94 To the contrary, as studies have shown, 
regimes can perform many other tasks than solely regulatory ones, and they can be effective – 
in a sense of contributing to or solving problems that led to their creation – in a variety of ways. 
Yet there appears to be a pronounced tendency to consider hard-law arrangements superior to 
soft-law ones and to view the development in the direction of legally binding norms as desirable 
and beneficial. Next to the previously mentioned appeal of such norms to many Arctic 
commentators and officials, we can also observe within the council some changes that are more 
gradual and incremental in nature95, which in turn draws our attention to the idea of institutional 
dynamics and its potential effects on a regime’s effectiveness.96 It is known that international 
environmental regimes, like other social institutions, change both in response to endogenous 
forces and exogenous pressures. Conceivably, in the case of the Arctic Council, seeing the 
rapidly and profoundly changing character of the socio-ecological setting in which it is 
operating, either or both can have major consequences for the AC’s effectiveness, giving 
credence to academic scrutiny of this aspect of the council. Again, considering the previous 
argument, changes in the external environment and the unprecedented interest in the Arctic 
they generate should not automatically result in a line of reasoning that perceives regulations 
and legally binding norms stemming from the Arctic Council as the ultimate and most 
functional solutions to Arctic challenges. Some scholars take contrary positions: “[T]he crisis 
of climate change requires a constant, critical re-evaluation of our international legal order, and 
thus of our framing of and hopes for international legal thought.”97 From this perspective, much 
more important than promoting hard-law solutions becomes the consideration of the most 
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effective interplay between binding and nonbinding norms in regional and global governance, 
as well as continued inquiry into the effectiveness of soft-law instruments. Along with some 
other brief observations listed below, this presents an area in which the Arctic Council could 
serve as a very useful case study and potentially inform our general understanding of 
institutional effectiveness with new insights. 
 
Directions for future research - from the case of the Arctic Council to general literature 
on regime effectiveness 
While the application of the central ideas of the broader literature on institutional effectiveness 
served primarily to structure and illuminate our understanding of issues that should be 
addressed when speaking about and examining the effectiveness the Arctic Council, it also 
raised some new questions of a general nature about the performance of international 
environmental regimes. While it is beyond the scope and aim of this paper to consider them 
here in detail, they point to possible future directions for research for Arctic and IR scholars. 
Those questions include the previously mentioned interplay between binding and nonbinding 
norms and instruments in regional and global governance, further investigation into the 
cognitive causal mechanism and the relation between institutional dynamics and effectiveness 
– in particular, the effects of such dynamics on institutional interplay.  
When it comes to the first issue, it appears that one of more interesting and potentially 
fruitful lines of inquiry lies at the intersection of IR and legal studies, where legal scholarship 
on legally nonbinding norms and compliance with them could inform analysis of international 
soft-law institutions such as the Arctic Council. After all, questions such as “Do states comply 
with soft law; what factors compel states to comply; do these factors differ depending on 




to hard law”98 are debated in depth within the legal community concerned with the international 
normative order, at least to the same extent as among IR scholars. Moreover, perhaps the 
combination of legal and IR thought could also shed new light on the very idea of “compliance 
with international soft law”, questioned by some academics as potentially unproductive and 
backward looking99 and could advance our understanding of the meaning of effectiveness of 
soft-law regimes in general terms.  
Regarding further investigation into the cognitive causal mechanism, the Arctic 
Council presents an excellent case study, as the main forms of the council’s influence have 
been its scientific outputs and the dissemination of its scientific findings in various issue 
domains. Such inquiries could not only contribute to general literature on institutional 
effectiveness, but they could also potentially help respond to “the urgent need to shorten the 
time it takes to for scientific understanding to be translated into policy in the Arctic” and could 
address “a wide gap between what we know and how we act.”100 At the same time, findings 
from this line of research could prove valuable for other international environmental 
cooperation mechanisms, where existing scientific knowledge often fails to translate into 
action. While methodologically challenging and difficult101, this important issue certainly 
appears worth further exploration. 
The third question that arose in the context of the Arctic Council and that can also 
generate insights into our general understanding of institutional effectiveness concerns the 
institutional dynamics and with observing how changes within the institution (incremental in 
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the case of the AC) affect its interplay with other international bodies. For instance, whereas 
Stokke thoroughly examined various niches that the council has been able to fill with respect 
to Arctic shipping and pollution, he did not consider how dynamics and changes within the 
council might affect its ability to occupy those niches. To some extent this important question 
and the idea of the relationship between changes in the Arctic Council and its effectiveness has 
been undertaken by Spence; however, in her study built on the concept of boundary 
organisation, the focus was almost exclusively on the impact of changes observed in the council 
on the qualities of knowledge generated within the AC, without reference to consequences of 
those developments for the council’s causal mechanisms of influence. Since neither the 
institutions nor their effectiveness is static (on the contrary, it fluctuates with time), this line of 
inquiry could significantly enrich our body of knowledge of international environmental 
regimes in general, and specifically with respect to the development and maturation of soft-
law regimes.  
Finally, as Andresen points out, since the peak of empirical studies of international 
environmental regimes in the end of 1990s, analytical advances in the field have not been 
combined with new empirical research, which could see their significance reduced and 
potential for further refinement decreased. As he argues, diverging interests and focus on other 
issue areas are “no substitute for effectiveness studies”102; and, as presented here, many aspects 
of regime effectiveness still remain unaddressed and deserve scholarly attention and efforts. 
Also seen from this much broader perspective, a deepened inquiry of the Arctic Council – an 
example of a soft-law institution and an innovative governance arrangement – appears worth 
pursuing and of significant value to our broader knowledge of international relations.  
  
 
                                              





The Arctic Council’s primary objective is to foster cooperation between its members and 
permanent participants on common Arctic issues – in particular, issues of sustainable 
development and environmental protection in the Arctic. Throughout its 20 years in existence, 
the AC, as a result of combined forces of globalisation and climate change, has moved from 
the peripheries of international relations to become the preeminent intergovernmental forum 
for the Arctic region, recognised as such by Arctic and non-Arctic states and nonstate actors 
alike. As it moves forward in an increasingly dynamic and globalised environment, the Arctic 
Council will continue facing numerous challenges, and the ways in which it can adapt to them 
will determine its prospects of remaining a relevant and respected forum for addressing Arctic 
issues. In all those efforts, the scholarly community may support the efforts of policy makers 
with a systematic inquiry of the AC’s effectiveness as well as informing it with findings from 
studies of other regional and global environmental regimes. In order to support advancement 
along that path, this article put forward the framework for future assessments of the 
effectiveness of the council based on the broader discussion of effectiveness in the international 
environmental regime literature. While the article did not aim at an actual evaluation of the 
effectiveness of the Council and did not carry out such an assessment, the focus on elements 
such as causal mechanisms behind the Council’s influence pointed out, among others, the AC’s 
potential for increased normative impact over Arctic states and other actors with interests in 
the region. This impact could be stemming not only from, as often repeated, the recent legally 
binding agreements negotiated under the auspices of the Arctic Council but also from the 
Council’s newly developed nonbinding framework on black carbon and methane – signalling 
areas that merit closer attention in future research and proving the value behind the systematic 
application of insights from general literature to our thinking about the AC. At the same time, 




questions not yet fully answered in the IR literature on the effectiveness of international 
environmental regimes and worthy of closer examination. They concern the interplay between 
binding and nonbinding norms and instruments in regional and global governance, deepened 
understanding of the cognitive causal mechanism and the relation between institutional 
dynamics and effectiveness. Addressing them might prove helpful not only to enhancing our 
comprehension of the council but also of other regimes and sources of their influence. 
In conclusion, one aspect regarding the council’s effectiveness – as of any other 
institution - appears particularly worth stressing: its ability to perform effectively not only at 
any given moment in time but also to adjust agilely to changing conditions, and with that to 
remain effective on a long-term scale. It could be argued that just as the Arctic is on the leading 
edge regarding the progress of climate change, the Arctic Council could be considered on the 
leading edge of thinking about and innovating with procedures for achieving a high level of 
adaptiveness to future changes, without signing away its present accomplishments. In this 
realm the contributions from the academic community could prove particularly valuable under 
the condition that they are produced via means of systematic inquiry and in a transparent 





ACAP. “Arctic Contaminants Action Program,” 2018. https://www.arctic-
council.org/index.php/en/acap-home. 
Abbott, W. Kenneth, and Duncan Snidal. " Hard and Soft Law in International Governance." 
International Organization 54, no. 3 (2000): 421–456.  
Adger, W. Neil, and Andrew Jordan. “Sustainability: Exploring the Processes and Outcomes 
of Governance.” In Governing Sustainability, edited by W. Neil Adger and Andrew 
Jordan, 3–31. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2009. 
Andresen, S. et al. Science and Politics in International Environmental Regimes: Between 
Integrity and Involvement. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000. 
Arctic Council. Arctic Council Rules of Procedure. Revised by the Arctic Council at the 
Eight Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting, Kiruna, Sweden, May 15, 2013 (2013). 
———. “Fairbanks Declaration on the Occassion of the Tenth Ministerial Meeting of the 
Arctic Council. 11 May 2017, Fairbanks, Alaska, U.S.A.,” 2017. 
———. “Framework for Action on Enhanced Black Carbon and Methane Emission Reduc- 
Tions, Annex 4, Iqaluit [NU (Canada)] 2015 SAO Report to Ministers,” 2015. 
———. Kiruna Declaration, 2013. 
———. Vision for the Arctic, 2013. 
Arctic Governance Project, ed. Arctic Governance in an Era of Transformative Change: 
Critical Questions, Governance Principles, Ways Forward, 2010. 
Bilder, Richard B. “Beyond Compliance: Helping Nations Cooperate.” In Commitment and 
Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the International Legal System, edited 
by Dinah L. Shelton, 65–74. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. 
Bloom, ET. “Establishment of the Arctic Council.” American Journal of International Law 




Borgerson, Scott G. “Arctic Meltdown. The Economic and Security Implications of Global 
Warming.” Foreign Affairs 87, no. 2 (2008): 63–77.  
Breitmeier, Helmut, Oran R. Young, and Michael Zürn. Analyzing International 
Environmental Regimes. From Case Study to Database. Cambridge, Massachussets; 
London, England: The MIT Press, 2006. 
Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council. Ottawa, Canada, 1996. 
Downie, D.L., and T. Fenge, eds. Northern Lights against POPs: Combating Toxic Threats 
in the Arctic. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2003. 
Duyck, Sébastien. “What Role for the Arctic in the UN Paris Climate Conference (COP-
21)?” In Arctic Yearbook, edited by Lassi Heininen, Heather Exner-Pirot, and Joel 
Plouffe, 2015. 
Exner-Pirot, Heather. “The Arctic Council, a Victory for Soft Law & Soft Security.” The 
UArctic Magazine Shared Voices. Special Issue. Arctic Council at 20, 2016. 
Fenge, Terry, and Bernard Funston. “The Practice and Promise of the Arctic Council. 
Independent Report Commissioned by Greenpeace,” 2015.  
Graff, J. “Fight for the Top of the World.” Time, September 19, 2007.  
Haas, Peter M. “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy 
Coordination.” International Organization 46, no. 1 (1992): 1–35. 
Kanie, Norichika, Steven Bernstein, Frank Biermann, and Peter M. Haas. “Introduction: 
Global Governance through Goal Setting.” In Governing through Goals. Sustainable 
Development Goals as Governance Innovation, edited by Norichika Kanie and Frank 
Biermann, 1–27. Cambridge, Massachussets; London, England: The MIT Press, 2017. 
Kankaanpää, Paula, and Oran R. Young. “The Effectiveness of the Arctic Council.” Polar 
Research 31 (2012): 1–14.  




and Rescue Agreement: A Shift of the Arctic Regime toward a Hard Law Basis?” 
Marine Policy 36, no. 3 (2012): 832–38. 
Keohane, Robert O. “Neoliberal Institutionalism: A Perspective on World Politics.” In 
International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory, 
edited by Robert O Keohane, 1–20. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989. 
Keskitalo, E.C.H. Negotiating the Arctic. The Construction of an International Region. New 
York, London: Routledge, 2004. 
Khan, Sabaa A. “The Global Commons through a Regional Lens: The Arctic Council on 
Short-Lived Climate Pollutants.” Transnational Environmental Law 6, no. 01 (March 9, 
2017): 131–52.  
Koivurova, T., P. Kankaanpaa, and A. Stepien. “Innovative Environmental Protection: 
Lessons from the Arctic.” Journal of Environmental Law, no. 2013 (2015): 1–27.  
Koivurova, Timo. “Limits and Possibilities of the Arctic Council in a Rapidly Changing 
Scene of Arctic Governance.” Polar Record 46, no. 02 (September 8, 2009): 146.  
———. “The Limits of the Arctic Council,” 2003, 186–88. 
http://www.rha.is/static/files/NRF/OpenAssemblies/Oulu2006/project-
legal_koivurova.pdf. 
Koivurova, Timo, and Leena Heinämäki. “The Participation of Indigenous Peoples in 
International Norm-Making in the Arctic.” Polar Record 42, no. 221 (2006): 101–9. 
Koivurova, Timo, and David VanderZwaag. “The Arctic Council and 10 Years: Retrospect 
and Prospects.” University of British Columbia Law Review 40, no. 1 (2007): 121–94. 
Kratochwil, Friedrich, and Gerard Ruggie. “International Organization: A State of the Art on 
an Art of the State.” International Organization 40, no. 4 (1986): 753–75. 
Mitchell, Ronald B. “Evaluating the Performance of Environmental Institutions: What to 




Findings, Applications, and Research Frontiers, edited by Oran R. Young, Leslie A. 
King, and Heike Schroeder, 79–114. Cambridge, Massachussets; London, England: The 
MIT Press, 2008. 
Molenaar, Erik J. “Governance of Arctic Shipping. Balancing Rights and Interests of Arctic 
States and User States.” In Governance of Arctic Shipping. Balancing Rights and 
Interests of Arctic States and User States, edited by Robert C. Beckman, Tore 
Henriksen, Kristine Dalaker Kraabel, Erik J. Molenaar, and J. Ashley Roach, 24–67. 
Leiden, Boston: Brill Nijhoff, 2017. 
Nilsson, Annika E. “Knowing the Arctic: The Arctic Council as a Cognitive Forerunner.” In 
The Arctic Council: Its Place in the Future of Arctic Governance, edited by Thomas S. 
Axworthy, Timo Koivurova, and Waliul Hasanat, 190–224. Munk-Gordon Arctic 
Security Program, 2012. 
Nilsson, Annika E., and Timo Koivurova. “Shared Decision-Making in a Changing Arctic 
Political Landscape.” In Arctic Resilience Report, edited by Marcus Carson and Gary 
Peterson, 128–46. Stockholm: Stockholm Environment Institute and Stockholm 
Resilience Centre, 2016. 
NSIDC. “Arctic Sea Ice Extent Remains Low; 2009 Sees Third-Lowest Mark,” October 6, 
2009. https://nsidc.org/news/newsroom/20091005_minimumpr.html. 
———. “Arctic Sea Ice Shatters All Previous Record Lows,” October 1, 2007. 
https://nsidc.org/news/newsroom/2007_seaiceminimum/20071001_pressrelease.html. 
Oberthür, Sebastian, and Thomas Gehring. “Institutional Interaction. Ten Years of Scholarly 
Development.” In Managing Institutional Complexity: Regime Interplay and Global 
Environmental Change, edited by Sebastian Oberthür and Olav Schram Stokke, 25–58. 
Cambridge, Massachussets; London, England: The MIT Press, 2011. 




Regime Interplay and Global Environmental Change. Cambridge, Massachussets; 
London, England: MIT Press, 2011. 
Offerdal, Kristine. “Oil, Gas and the Environment.” In International Cooperation and Arctic 
Governance. Regime Effectiveness and Northern Region Building, edited by Olav 
Schram Stokke and Geir Honneland, 138–63. London and New York: Routledge, 2007. 
Prip, Christian. “The Arctic Council and Biodiversity - Need for a Stronger Management 
Framework?” Nordic Environmental Law Journal 2 (2016): 37–53. 
Rogne, Odd, Volker Rachold, Louwrens Hacquebord, and Robert Corell. IASC after 25 
Years. Special Issue of the IASC Bulletin, 2015. http://iasc25.iasc.info. 
Rottem, Svein Vigeland. “A Note on the Arctic Council Agreements.” Ocean Development & 
International Law 46, no. 1 (2015): 50–59.  
Scrivener, David. “Arctic Environmental Cooperation in Transition.” Polar Record 35, no. \ 
SDWG. “SDWG Projects 2015-2017,” 2016. http://www.sdwg.org/activities/current-
projects/. 
———. “Strategic Framework 2017,” 2017. http://arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-
us/working-groups/sdwg. 
Shelton, Dinah L. “Introduction. Law, Non-Law and the Problem of ‘Soft Law.’” In 
Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the International 
Legal System, edited by Dinah L Shelton, 1–18. Oxford University Press, 2000. 
Smieszek, Malgorzata. “The Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific 
Cooperation: From Paper to Practice.” In Arctic Yearbook, edited by Lassi Heininen, 
Heather Exner-Pirot, and Joel Plouffe, 2017. 
Smith, R., Tom Barry, and F. Katerås. Arctic Biodiversity Congress. Co-Chairs Report. 
Akureyri, Iceland: Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna, 2014. 




Limits of the Effectiveness of a Boundary Organization.” Review of Policy Research, 
2017. 




———. Disaggregating International Regimes. A New Approach to Evaluation and 
Comparison. Cambridge, Massachussets; London, England: MIT Press, 2012. 
———. “Examining the Consequences of Arctic Institutions.” In International Cooperation 
and Arctic Governance. Regime Effectiveness and Northern Region Building, edited by 
Olav Schram Stokke and Geir Honneland. London and New York: Routledge, 2007. 
———. “Interplay Management, Niche Selection, and Arctic Environmental Governance.” 
In Managing Institutional Complexity: Regime Interplay and Global Environmental 
Change, 143–70. Cambridge, Massachussets; London, England: MIT Press, 2011.  
———. “Regime Interplay in Arctic Shipping Governance: Explaining Regional Niche 
Selection.” International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 13, 
no. 123 (2013): 65–85.  
———. “The Interplay of International Regimes: Putting Effectiveness Theory to Work.” 
FNI Report 4/01. Norway, 2001.  
Stokke, Olav Schram, Geir Honneland, and Peter Johan Schei. “Pollution and Conservation.” 
In International Cooperation and Arctic Governance. Regime Effectiveness and 
Northern Region Building, edited by Olav Schram Stokke and Geir Honneland, 78–111. 
London and New York: Routledge, 2007. 
Stokke, Olav Schram, and Sebastian Oberthür. “Introduction. Institutional Interaction in 




Interplay and Global Environmental Change, 1–24. Cambridge, Massachussets; 
London, England: MIT Press, 2011.  
Supreme Audit Institutions of Denmark, Norway, The Russian Federation, Sweden and the 
United States of America. “The Arctic Council: Perspectives on a Changing Arctic, The 
Council’s Work, and Key Challenges. A Joint Memorandum of a Multilateral Audit on 
the Arctic States’ National Authorities’ Work with the Arctic Council,” 2015.  
Tennberg, Monica. Arctic Environmental Cooperation. A Study in Governmentality. 
Rovaniemi: University of Lapland, 1999. 
Tesar, Clive, Marc Andre Dubois, Martin Sommerkorn, and Alexander Shestakov. “Warming 
to the Subject: The Arctic Council and Climate Change.” Polar Journal 6, no. 2 (2016): 
417–29.  
U.S. Geological Survey, USGS. “Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of 
Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle.” Vol. 2000, 2008.  
Underdal, Arild. “Methodological Challenges in the Study of Regime Effectiveness.” In 
Regime Consequences. Methodological Challenges and Research Strategies, edited by 
Arild Underdal and Oran R. Young, 27–48. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
2004. 
Underdal, Arild, and Oran R. Young, eds. Regimes Consequences. Methodological 
Challenges and Research Strategies. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004. 
Wehrmann, Dorothea. “Shaping Changing Circumpolar Agendas: The Identification and 
Significance of ‘Emerging Issues’ Addressed in the Arctic Council.” In Arctic Yearbook, 
edited by Lassi Heininen, Heather Exner-Pirot, and Joel Plouffe, 2016.  
Young, Oran R. “Arctic State Changes: Implications for Governance,” 2009. 
———. “Building Regimes for Socioecological Systems.” In Institutions and Environmental 




Young, Leslie A. King, and Heike Schroeder, 115–44. Cambridge, Massachussets; 
London, England: The MIT Press, 2008. 
———. Creating Regimes: Arctic Accords and International Governance. Ithaca and 
London: Cornell University Press, 1998. 
———, ed. The Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes. Causal Connections 
and Behavioral Mechanisms. Cambridge, Massachussets; London, England: MIT Press, 
1999. 
———. Governance in World Affairs. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1999. 
———. Institutional Dynamics: Emergent Patterns in International Environmental 
Governance. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010. 
———. “Institutional Linkages in International Society: Polar Perspectives.” Global 
Governance 2, no. 1 (1996): 1–24. 
———. “Regime Effectiveness: Taking Stock.” In The Effectiveness of International 
Environmental Regimes. Causal Connections and Behavioral Mechanisms, edited by 
Oran R. Young, 249–79. Cambridge, Massachussets; London, England: MIT Press, 
1999. 
———. “The Arctic Council at Twenty: How to Remain Effective in a Rapidly Changing 
Environment.” UC Irvine Law Review 6, no. 99 (2016): 99–120. 
———. “The Consequences of International Regimes. A Framework for Analysis.” In 
Regime Consequences. Methodological Challenges and Research Strategies, edited by 
Arild Underdal and Oran R. Young. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004. 
———. “The Structure of Arctic Cooperation:  Solving Problems/ Seizing Opportunities.” In 
A Paper Prepared for the Fourth Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region, 
Rovaniemi, 27-29 August 2000., 1–22, 2000. 




Knowledge, Cutting-Edge Themes, and Research Strategies.” Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 108, no. 50 (December 
13, 2011): 19853–60.  
  
 
